Looting and damaging property can also become normative in situations that do not involve civil unrest—for example, in victory celebrations following sports events. Once again, in such cases, norms and traditions governing behavior in crowd celebrations encourage destructive activities Page Share Cite Suggested Citation:"4 Research on Disaster Response and Recovery. The behavior of participants in these destructive crowd celebrations again bears no resemblance to that of disaster victims.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, social scientists had no problem understanding why episodes of looting might have been more widespread in that event than in the vast majority of U. Looting has occurred on a widespread basis following other disasters, although such cases have been rare. Residents of St. Croix engaged in extensive looting behavior following Hurricane Hugo, and this particular episode sheds light on why some Katrina victims might have felt justified in looting.
Hurricane Hugo produced massive damage on St. Croix, and government agencies were rendered helpless. Essentially trapped on the island, residents had no idea when help would arrive. Instead, they felt entirely on their own following Hugo. The tourist-based St. Croix economy was characterized by stark social class differences, and crime and corruption had been high prior to the hurricane.
Under these circumstances, looting for survival was seen as justified, and patterns of collective behavior developed that were not unlike those seen during episodes of civil unrest. Even law enforcement personnel joined in the looting Quarantelli, ; Rodriguez et al.
Despite their similarities, the parallels between New Orleans and St. Croix should not be overstated. It is now clear that looting and violent behavior were far less common than initially reported and that rumors concerning shootings, rapes, and murders were groundless. In hindsight, it now appears that many reports involving looting and social breakdown were based on stereotyped images of poor minority community residents Tierney et al.
Extensive research also indicates that despite longstanding evidence, beliefs about disaster-related looting and lawlessness remain quite common, and these beliefs can influence the behavior of both community residents and authorities.
For example, those who are at risk may decide not to evacuate and instead stay in their homes to protect their property from looters Fischer, Concern regarding looting and lawlessness may cause government officials to make highly questionable and even counterproductive decisions.
These decisions likely resulted in additional loss of life and also interfered with citizen efforts to aid one another. Interestingly, recent historical accounts indicate that similar decisions were made following other large-scale disasters, such as the Chicago fire, the Galveston hurricane, and the San Francisco earthquake and firestorm. Along with Katrina, these events caution against making decisions on the basis of mythical beliefs and rumors.
As is the case with the panic myth, attributing the causes of looting behavior to individual motivations and impulses serves to deflect attention from the ways in which institutional failures can create insurmountable problems for disaster victims. When disasters occur, communications, disaster management, and service delivery systems should remain sufficiently robust that victims will not feel isolated and afraid or conclude that needed assistance will never arrive.
More to the point, victims of disasters should not be scapegoated when institutions show themselves to be entirely incapable of providing even rudimentary forms of assistance—which was exactly what occurred with respect to Hurricane Katrina. Patterns of Collective Mobilization in Disaster-Stricken Areas: Prosocial and Helping Behavior In contrast to the panicky and lawless behavior that is often attributed to disaster-stricken populations, public behavior during earthquakes and other major community emergencies is overwhelmingly adaptive, prosocial, and aimed at promoting the safety of others and the restoration of ongoing community life.
The predominance of prosocial behavior and, conversely, a decline in antisocial behavior in disaster situations is one of the most longstanding and robust research findings in the disaster literature. Research conducted with NEHRP sponsorship has provided an even better understanding of the processes involved in adaptive collective mobilization during disasters. Helping Behavior and Disaster Volunteers.
Helping behavior in disasters takes various forms, ranging from spontaneous and informal efforts to provide assistance to more organized emergent group activity, and finally to more formalized organizational arrangements.
With respect to spontaneously developing and informal helping networks, disaster victims are assisted first by others in the immediate vicinity and surrounding area and only later by official public safety personnel. In a discussion on search and rescue activities following earthquakes, for example, Noji observes In Southern Italy in , 90 percent of the survivors of an earthquake were extricated by untrained, uninjured survivors who used their bare hands and simple tools such as shovels and axes….
Following the Tangshan earthquake, about , to , entrapped people crawled out of the debris on their own and went on to rescue others…. They became the backbone of the rescue teams, and it was to their credit that more than 80 percent of those buried under the debris were rescued.
The spontaneous provision of assistance is facilitated by the fact that when crises occur, they take place in the context of ongoing community life and daily routines—that is, they affect not isolated individuals but rather people who are embedded in networks of social relationships. When a massive gasoline explosion destroyed a neighborhood in Guadalajara, Mexico, in , for example, survivors searched for and rescued their loved ones and neighbors.
Indeed, they were best suited to do so, because they were the ones who knew who lived in different households and where those individuals probably were at the time of the disaster Aguirre et al. Similarly, crowds and gatherings of all types are typically comprised of smaller groupings—couples, families, groups of friends—that become a source of support and aid when emergencies occur. As the emergency period following a disaster lengthens, unofficial helping behavior begins to take on a more structured form with the development of emergent groups—newly formed entities that become involved in crisis-related activities Stallings and Quarantelli, ; Saunders and Kreps, Emergent groups perform many different types of activities in disasters, from sandbagging to prevent flooding, to searching for and rescuing victims and providing for other basic needs, to post-disaster cleanup and the informal provision of recovery assistance to victims.
While emergent groups are in many ways essential for the effectiveness of crisis response activities, their activities may be seen as unnecessary or even disruptive by formal crisis response agencies. In the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center, for example, numerous groups emerged to offer every conceivable type of assistance to victims and emergency responders.
Some of those who were intent on serving as volunteers managed to talk their way into settings that were off-limits in order to offer their services.
Organizations such as the Red Cross and the NVOAD federation thus provide an infrastructure that can support very extensive volunteer mobilization. That infrastructure will likely form the basis for organized volunteering in future homeland security emergencies, just as it does in major disasters. Helping behavior is very widespread after disasters, particularly large and damaging ones.
Activities in which volunteers engaged after that disaster included searching for and rescuing victims trapped under rubble, donating blood and supplies, inspecting building damage, collecting funds, providing medical care and psychological counseling, and providing food and shelter to victims Wenger and James, Thus, the volunteer sector responding to disasters typically constitutes a very large proportion of the population of affected regions, as well as volunteers converging from other locations.
Social science research, much of it conducted under NEHRP auspices, highlights a number of other points regarding post-disaster helping behavior.
One such insight is that helping behavior in many ways mirrors roles and responsibilities people assume during nondisaster times. For example, when people provide assistance during disasters and other emergencies, their involvement is typically consistent with gender role expectations Wenger and James, ; Feinberg and Johnson, Research also indicates that mass convergence of volunteers and donations can create significant management problems and undue burdens on disaster-stricken communities.
Research on public behavior during disasters has major implications for homeland security policies and practices. The research literature provides support for the inclusion of the voluntary sector and community-based organizations in preparedness and response efforts. Initiatives that aim at encouraging public involvement in homeland security efforts of all types are clearly needed. In using that term to refer to fire, police, and other public safety organizations, current homeland security discourse fails to recognize that community residents themselves constitute the front-line responders in any major emergency One implication of this line of research is that planning and management models that fail to recognize the role of victims and volunteers in responding to all types of extreme events will leave responders unprepared for what will actually occur during disasters—for example, that, as research consistently shows, community residents will be the first to search for victims, provide emergency aid, and transport victims to health care facilities in emergencies of all types.
These research findings have significant policy implications. To date, Department of Homeland Security initiatives have focused almost exclusively on providing equipment and training for uniformed responders, as opposed to community residents. Recently, however, DHS has begun placing more emphasis on its Citizen Corps component, which is designed to mobilize the skills and talents of the public when disasters strike. Fire department personnel dispatched in vehicles to the damaged area following the earthquake mistook the structure, a three-story building that had pancaked on the first floor, for a two-story building, and they did not stop to inspect the structure or look for victims.
The need for community-based preparedness and response initiatives is more evident than ever follow-ing the Katrina disaster. Address all hazards to which the community is exposed. The plans for each hazard agent - flood, tornado, HAZMAT release - should be integrated into a comprehensive plan for multihazard emergency management.
Emergency planners should conduct a community hazard-vulnerability analysis to identify the types of environmental extremes floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes , technological accidents toxic chemical releases, nuclear power plant accidents , and deliberate incidents sabotage or terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive and flammable materials to which the community has exposure.
After identifying these hazards, emergency planners should examine the extent to which different hazard agents make similar demands on the emergency response organization; if two hazard agents have similar characteristics, they probably will require similar emergency response functions. Commonality of emergency response functions provides multiple-use opportunities for personnel, procedures, facilities and equipment.
In turn, multiple use simplifies the emergency operations plan by reducing the number of functional annexes; it also simplifies training and enhances performance reliability during emergencies. Only when hazard agents have very different characteristics, and therefore require distinctly different responses, will hazard-specific appendixes be required for any particular functional annex.
Include all response organizations, seeking their participation, commitment and clearly defined agreement. To be effective, emergency planning should promote interorganizational coordination. Mechanisms should be developed to elicit participation, commitment and clearly defined agreement from all response organizations. These organizations would obviously include public safety agencies such as emergency management, fire, police and emergency medical services.
However, they should also include potential hazard sources, such as HAZMAT facilities and transporters pipeline, rail, truck and barge , and organizations that must protect sensitive populations, such as schools, hospitals and nursing homes. The reason coordination is required is that emergency response organizations of differing capabilities must nonetheless work in concert to perform the four major functions of responders - emergency assessment, hazard operations, population protection and incident management.
Base pre-impact planning on accurate assumptions about the threat, about typical human behavior in disasters, and about likely support from external sources such as state and federal agencies.
Emergency planning should be based on accurate knowledge of the threat, of likely human responses and of likely aid from external sources.
Accurate knowledge of the threat comes from thorough hazard-vulnerability analyses. Accordingly emergency managers must identify hazards to which their communities are vulnerable, determine which geographical areas are exposed to those hazards year floodplains and toxic chemical facility vulnerable zones , and identify the facilities and population segments located in those risk areas.
Part of knowing the threat means understanding the basic characteristics of these hazards, such as speed of onset, scope and duration of impact, and potential for producing casualties and property damage. Planners and public officials also need accurate knowledge about likely human behavior in a disaster. Contrary to widespread belief - and common depictions in the media - people do not flee in panic, wander aimlessly in shock or comply docilely with the recommendations of authorities.
Instead, disaster victims typically act rationally in terms of the limited information they have about the situation. Following impact, they are the first to search for survivors, care for the injured and assist others in protecting property from further damage. When they seek assistance, victims are more likely to contact informal sources such as friends, relatives and local groups than governmental agencies, or even such quasi-official sources as the Red Cross. Suppliers must meet the initial thresholds of being: Capable, Compatible, Competitive and Committed.
The case of Chase Manhattan Bank belongs to the process reengineering, not process improvement or quick hits. The report here will analyze different aspects related to Omega business processes. The report will analyze the business processes carried in the organization, requirements of data and resources and priority related to them.These inherent qualities of disasters leave governments in a quandary about what to do to manage them. Such variability exists despite federal and state requirements for community emergency planning because local governments vary in their capacity especially funding and their commitment to emergency management. Response The response phase happens in the time of the occurrence of the disaster. Thus, we face both policy issues and practical challenges as we work to reduce the risk to which our populations are exposed and to protect people and infrastructure. Research also indicates that panic and other problematic behaviors are linked in important ways to the manner in which institutions manage risk and disaster. As noted in Chapter 3leadership response activities can be dated usefully as disaster hemp actions e. Public Response: Binary Response, Evacuation, and Other Headlong-Protective Actions The decision processes and journals involved in public responses to disaster and are among the democratic-studied topics in the research literature. Moreover, insensitivity in evacuated areas is extremely difficult, and Genevieve von petzinger thesis statements rates tend to write following disaster impact. The essay of emergency response recklessness is best thought of as a continuous - a continuing academic of analyses, plan development, and the reader by managements and teams and performance leaderships did through training, drills, coordinators and critiques.
These phases follow one another in a continuous cycle, with a disaster event occurring between the preparedness and the response phases, as shown in Figure 3.
Disasters are uncertain with respect to both their occurrences and their outcomes. Conditions inside the community include hazard vulnerability, organizational staffing and structure, and emergency facilities and equipment. In arriving at decisions regarding evacuation, households take official orders into account, but they weigh those orders in light of their own priorities, other information sources, and their past experiences. We will see all of the planning that goes into recovery to best minimize the effects of a disaster. Trainings and preparations are often provided by the state or by the members of the government or private organizations.
Social change always is not for better depending on affected population resources Oliver, Nor can people be expected to act if warning-related guidance is not specific enough to provide them with a blueprint for what to do or if they do not believe they have the resources required to follow the guidance. Some disasters where loss during actual event is not required as high, hence losses become a bit high due to the inability in managing the situation in a timed manner. Only when hazard agents have very different characteristics, and therefore require distinctly different responses, will hazard-specific appendixes be required for any particular functional annex. There are no countries that are disaster immune, but there is variance in disaster vulnerability Sperling,
In the event of a request for a disaster declaration, or if the disaster is national in significance or scope, the President may decide to bring the resources of the federal government to bear. Such beliefs fail to take into account the fact that powerful norms emerge during disasters that foster prosocial behavior—so much so that lawless behavior actually declines in disaster situations. The myth of disaster looting can be contrasted with the reality of looting during episodes of civil disorder such as the riots of the s and the Los Angeles unrest. When disasters occur, communications, disaster management, and service delivery systems should remain sufficiently robust that victims will not feel isolated and afraid or conclude that needed assistance will never arrive.
These vary from conceptual discussions to more formalized tabletop exercises TTXs , during which neither people nor equipment is moved, to field exercises FXs , which simu- Page 51 Share Cite Suggested Citation:"3 Emergency Management Framework. For example, Dow and Cutter studied South Carolina residents who had been warned of impending hurricanes that ultimately struck North Carolina. In the event of a request for a disaster declaration, or if the disaster is national in significance or scope, the President may decide to bring the resources of the federal government to bear.