At a. And while NORAD commanders did, indeed, order the Langley fighters to scramble at , as Scott and Arnold testified, it was not in response to the hijacking of American 77 or United Rather, they were chasing a ghost [Flight 11]. NEADS was entering the most chaotic period of the morning. The Washington Post reported in its August 3, , edition that: Some staff members and commissioners of the Sept. Suspicion of wrongdoing ran so deep that the member commission, in a secret meeting at the end of its tenure in summer , debated referring the matter to the Justice Department for criminal investigation, according to several commission sources.
Staff members and some commissioners thought that e-mails and other evidence provided enough probable cause to believe that military and aviation officials violated the law by making false statements to Congress and to the commission, hoping to hide the bungled response to the hijackings, these sources said.
The tapes recordings According to Scoggins, however, "With American Airlines, we could never confirm if [Flight 11] was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds. They tracked it to New York on their radar scopes: 'I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down,' said Boston controller Mark Hodgkins. The problem, Scoggins told me later, was that American Airlines refused to confirm for several hours that its plane had hit the tower.
This lack of confirmation caused uncertainty that would be compounded in a very big way as the attack continued. Though airlines have their own means of monitoring the location of their planes and communicating with their pilots, they routinely go into information lockdown in a crisis.
Its existence came to light in interviews with FAA staff. Commission staff believes there is sufficient evidence that the false statements made to the commission were deliberately false.
The plan called for more advanced systems for Air Traffic Control, and improvements in ground-to-air surveillance and communication with new Doppler Radars and better transponders. Better computers and software were developed, air route traffic control centers were consolidated, and the number of flight service stations reduced.
Their primary duty was assistance to law enforcement. Quoting Maj. Larry Arnold: "We always viewed an attack from within our borders as a law enforcement issue, In April , NORAD considered an exercise in which an aircraft of foreign origin was hijacked by terrorists and flown into the Pentagon, like a missile, but rejected the scenario as implausible. Larry Arnold, stated " The Air Force has not implemented the actions it identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included integrating ASA operations into the Air Force's planning, programming, and funding cycle.
The Air Force has instead been focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations. It was a policy that had been in place, that is prohibiting knives larger than 4 inches.
It is a policy that it's my understanding had been in my place since the s. Knives were used as part of the meal service in the airlines. If you were to stop at a security -- or a souvenir shop, even beyond the secure area, it is possible that you could purchase, say, a pocketknife and so forth. And from the security intelligence experts, from the law enforcement people, the greater threats -- as has been indicated even by the staff report, the greater threats were from larger, more lethal weapons and from explosives.
Clearly with the benefit of hindsight, as you pointed out, we have a different view. I do think it is important to remind ourselves, as the staff statement reminded us, that we are and were dealing with an incredibly intelligent, well-trained, disciplined terrorists who may have used any other number of common household items as a lethal weapon as well. At least in retrospect, should not that have been the lesson of the World Trade Center bombing?
And again, I do want to go back to a point that has been made earlier. There was a growing domestic concern and I think that was reflected in some of the intelligence circulars, some of the SDs that the FAA issued. So there was a growing concern. But I think the greatest thrust, the greater concern was still international.
Should we have learned more from the World Trade Center? Boy, again, I think with the clarity of hindsight there, there are certainly questions there. Manno can comment on this question as well, explain to us how it was that you had a no-fly directive that applied to only 20 or so people, while there was a terrorist -- a TIPOFF list that included hundreds or thousands of people? Were you, Ms.
Manno, did your section have that list available to it? Did it even know that it existed? And if you did know that it existed and had it available, why weren't those names on a no-fly list? As I indicated earlier, the way that we received intelligence or information from the intelligence community was by identifying our statement of intelligence needs.
Based on that, the intelligence community provided us information that was relevant to aviation security. So based on the information we received, our analysts reviewed it and in the case where there was specific and credible information that people were actually targeting, making plans to target civil aviation, if we had identifying data, they were put on a security directive which directed the air carriers not to transport these people.
You know, let's break it down and ask it again. Or available to you and discarded as not important? But from my perspective, the names that I saw, and we'd see them in the security directive, they would be included in the security directive.
From my perspective, those names were the names that the intelligence community believed had some implication with aviation. Manno, or were they supplied to you and discarded as not having a relationship with aircraft? But the way that the system worked at the time, unless we received the intelligence reporting that identified to us names of interest and then to go into TIPOFF and search against that, it was not -- it was simply not used that way.
LEHMAN: It was perfectly all right to have them fly because they were terrorists in other things, there was no reason to put them on your watchlist, right? I mean, I don't understand the logic of this. MANNO: Well, the way that the process worked with the security directive is names were identified to an airline who then bumped those up against their reservation list to determine if somebody was actually going to fly.
And so I gather the decision at some place or another was that a suspected terrorist who had not specifically been linked to aircraft was okay to fly? MANNO: The names -- including the 20 names were names that were specifically identified to us in intelligence reporting. The process was for the intelligence reporting to indicate to us those that we ought to be concerned about. You didn't ask for a list of suspected terrorists?
For one thing, the airlines would not have been able to handle such a list. MANNO: Well, we know that today, sir, because today we are managing a similar list which is of about 3, names which requires the carriers to check against a reservation system, and they're struggling just even with those.
JOHN F. Your whole testimony is -- it talks about process. You described to us -- it sounded like an indoctrination course for your new employees describing the process. What about common sense? Didn't anybody ever -- did you ever step back and say, now look, my job is not to wait until the intelligence community gives me finished product, but to look at this and say, does it pass the commonsense test?
Does it pass the commonsense test to let young Arabs on with four-inch blades? Didn't any of you -leadership is about not taking the process which you hide behind, but about saying this is not sufficient.
Of course they can handle thousands of questionable people. Of course a young Arab should not be allowed on airplanes with four-inch blades, yet none of you applied common sense. Every time I fly, every time I make a reservation I get a frequent flyer credit. The airline has no difficulty in doing that for me, to check my name against its list every time. I can't see how it has a problem with 3, or 60, suspected terrorists. Let's accept that. But certainly with respect to all of the hijackings that have ever taken place before, you were anticipating and were working against the kind of hijacking that went to Havana or that asked for the release of prisoners and, you know, or the like.
And yet you never, either of you and I guess this would apply to Admiral Flynn as well, decided to have an expanded no-fly list of suspected terrorists, is that correct? Any answer beyond that? Are you saying you, who are current today, that there are only 3, people on a no-fly list today? A selectee and a no-fly list, and actually the number is greater than that. MANNO: So the way that the system works is that we obtain information from that list and people are put on the no-fly list based again on indications that they pose a threat to aviation.
MANNO: As an example, there is a lot of information that came out of the war on Afghanistan when the camps were discovered there, lists and things like that and those names, because of their ties to al Qaeda, are put on our no-fly list. GORTON: Well, I must say I would strongly suggest that when the intelligence agencies of the United States have a name that they expect or suspect to be a terrorist, that that name ought to be on the no-fly list.
And I think, in my view at least, that's a no-brainer. Back to you, Ms. Obviously to license a pilot requires a certain degree of education, but is there any monitoring of the schools at which young men and women receive that flight training? GARVEY: Commissioner, for the flight schools there are standards and requirements that a flight school would have to attain in order to get an FAA certificate, and depending on the level of training they are providing, those certificates would vary.
That just says you do a competent job. GORTON: But there's no connection -- the school doesn't have to report the names of the people who are taking the training or the degree of training that they've received to you to check against any kind of license application? Garvey, as the administrator, how much of your time did you spend on security matters? How often were you briefed, for example, by people like the Admiral or Mr. How did you get performance ratings of civil aviation security policies through the airlines and the airports and the like?
What share of your time did it take and what was your function in connection with it? One is how did I receive the sort of security information, and number two is how did we monitor sort of the day to day progress being made by security and I'll start with the second part. Security, like safety and efficiency, was responsible for establishing goals and objectives, and in this case it centered very much as has been indicated around some of the rule-making, some of the explosive detection machines and so forth.
That monitoring and oversight of that really occurred as part of management board meetings that were held on Monday and Friday. As to the security information, how did I receive it and so forth? As Mr. Manno indicated, there were on any given day there could be as high as intelligence faxes received by the Intelligence Office.
I would certainly not receive every one of those but anything that the Intelligence Office deemed important would come up to my office. If there was a particular urgency around an issue or something that the associate administrator was particularly concerned about that I would receive that briefing in person, or if I was not in the office at the time I would receive it perhaps later in the day by the -- from perhaps the deputy secretary.
So I would receive security briefings either through a written document that would come directly to my office or through an oral direct briefing from the associate administrator. To your knowledge was there any airline that ever was restless or objected that that operations guide was too lax and wanted or imposed itself a more stringent regulations on incoming -- on passengers? How is it that when you went through your various proceedings dealing with violations of federal law on the part of airlines and imposed fines that in fact, on average, the fines were reduced to 10 cents on the dollar?
Why is it that when you go through an entire system and say a fine ought to be so many thousands of dollars that that just isn't the end of it? First of all, I'd like to check the number. I'd heard that before and I've not had an opportunity -- I'm not sure that number is correct.
But I'd like to check it and I can certainly tell you that from the FAA's perspective, from my perspective, the civil penalties that we imposed were not as effective as we wanted them to be. We went back repeatedly to get those fines raised and they were raised incrementally. I think we were far more effective when it was levied against individuals then when it was levied against a company. Frankly, I think sometimes we found the best way to -- or sort of the best -- the more effective way was to publicize that and we did that.
But there's also the due process. The inspector or the special agent who first brings the action forward submits that and there is also, of course, the due process where the lawyers from -- for either the individual or the lawyers for the airline goes through the process with the FAA and a determination is made.
I don't know if its 10 cents on the dollar. It was never as high as we liked. GORTON: Well, that's a lot of due process to go to 10 cents on a dollar, and I guess we would appreciate it if you have the ability to do so, since you question whether or not that figure is accurate, to the extent of your ability to answer that question more precisely in writing later, we would very much appreciate it.
I think I do have some more questions, but the red light has been on for some time and it's Congressman Roemer's turn in this connection. KEAN: Okay, we'll come back to you. Congressman Roemer? I want to thank the panel and thank Senator Gorton for starting a very thorough round, a very fair round of questions. I want to start with just the larger policy question and the security system that we had in place on September 11, It just seems to me from a common sense point of view that in medicine, when a doctor looks at a patient, they just don't look at one disease.
If there's a low probability but high consequence possibility for that patient, we're going to look at a host of different scenarios. The military does the same thing. There may be a low probability but a high consequence attack. We get ready for it. Sports, the Superbowl coming up, there may be a low probability that the first play's going to be the bomb down the field, but there's a defense set up for it.
In our aviation security system, leading up to and on September 11, , it seems to me there's only one system in place, even though the clues and the threats are flowing in through this entire decade. Let me briefly bring up some of the overall policy clues and objectives.
In January '95 a Philippine National Police raid turns up materials in Manila where there is a proposed plot, among other things, to possibly crash an airplane into CIA headquarters. In , August, the intelligence community obtains information that a group of unidentified Arabs plans to fly an explosive laden plane into a foreign country -- from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. September the intelligence community obtains information that Usama bin Laden's next operation could involve flying aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.
November '98 the intelligence community obtains information that a Turkish Islamic extremist group has planned a suicide attack, in part involving a plane and crashing that with explosives into Ataturk's tomb.
The list, March , August , goes on. With respect to what we're doing here at home to protect our passengers and our planes, here's the information that we have at the FAA. We don't rule it out. And then finally published in July 17, , the Federal Register, quote, "Terrorism can occur anytime, anywhere in the United States.
Members of foreign terrorist groups, representatives from state sponsors of terrorism and radical fundamentalist elements from many nations are present in the United States. Thus an increasing threat to civil aviation from both foreign sources and potential domestic ones exist and needs to be prevented and countered.
So my question is, with all this evidence coming in - it's not a specific date, granted, but the dots are connected and they're large and they're looming and they're big. Why doesn't this result in a change in terrorism policy at our airports to try to expand the list of things that we're going to try to go after beyond the possibility of explosive devices on airplanes? Flynn, can you take the first crack at that? I mean, those things were there and it isn't that we disregarded them.
It isn't that I disregarded them. I didn't see -- there were contra-indications on a number of them. For example, the Manila one was perpetrated by people who went to very considerable extent not to be suicidal in the way that they conducted their attack.
The French one, you didn't mention it, but I spoke to the French inspector of police from the headquarters of the French police who came over to brief people in Washington, including me, about it. And I said, well, what about this business of going after the Eiffel Tower. And again, there were disconnects. How were they going to do that? How were they going to coerce pilots to do that? And she said, furthermore, rather than them wanting to kill everybody on board, there's a strong indication that Stockholm syndrome was going on at Marseille where the aircraft was.
Then with regard to the other things of how do you bring about taking an airliner and turning it into a missile? How would you coerce the pilot to fly into a building that's got people into it rather than in extremis, put it into a field or a woods or into the -- in the case of the CIA, into the Potomac?
How would you do that? And the notion of a fully-fledged member of al Qaeda being a pilot, at the same time with the intention of pulling people out of the cockpit and taking over, did not occur to me. Now, my point, when I go back to it, why didn't I spend more time? Why didn't I get more people around the table and say, how would they do this?
And come up with a plan, that's my regret. Flynn, you mentioned that we didn't develop policy and the big picture connecting the dots to change policy to proactively go after what terrorists might do given the threats that were out there - MR.
That isn't to say that we didn't look at a host of other things. Garvey, other people, the administrator, did you push for a policy change? Did you try to get meetings with other policy makers to address this growing concern that's mentioned in the FAA, Federal Register, that's mentioned in your slide presentation that you're presenting to people as you're traveling across the country in and ?
But the - MR. In that same time, the head of anti-terrorism for the FBI and I came to this building, into the secure place of the Committee on Intelligence and in it these staff -- there may be some people from that staff who happen to be coincidentally members of your staff -- the staff asked what are the indications or what are the threats to aviation? And John O'Neill said there are none. Now, that seemed to me to -- because there was particular indication of something going on in an airport, I wrote him a note.
John, how about the -- and he looked at the note, still didn't say anything, didn't change what he had said. And we came out of the meeting and I said, what about the -- that specific thing, and he said there's nothing to it. We're also being told that those groups that are there were -- they're essentially connected with Hezbollah or fundraisers rather than actual terrorist people plotting terrorism, and we're -- was told because pushed on it frequently, "Don't worry about it, we're not going to give you raw intelligence, we're not going to give you processed intelligence.
If there is a threat to aviation, we will tell you. You have , the World Trade Center, you have these groups that may or may not be associated with al Qaeda because nobody knew what al Qaeda was. Nobody knew, and to this day I'm not sure how much people understand the full motivations, capabilities, connections, et cetera of the al Qaeda organization.
Flynn, I just read an example as far back as September that the intelligence community obtained an information specific to Usama bin Laden that his next operation could involve flying aircraft loaded with explosives into a U. I mean, that's such a startling thing - MR. FLYNN: Let me get back on my train of thought, is that despite saying there are no indications of it happening, the commonsense of it is that it could happen, that where there are terrorists one of their likely targets will be aviation.
Manno, this list has approximately 61, names of people around the world that are prevented from flying, that are picked out by the State Department at that point and they're picked out because they're dangerous and they shouldn't be on airplanes, 61, names.
Your list, according to what you just said, or what our staff has told me, is 12 people. So there's a difference of 60, names, a difference of 60, names between what's been accumulated at the State Department as dangerous people, shouldn't be flying, and what you have with your 12 people. Now, I can't understand why there are not more efforts in liaison activities to reach out to State Department and start to bring some of those names over and prevent those people from flying.
MANNO: Well, again the process at the time was to include in the security directive names of people where there was specific and credible information that they posed a threat. Part of that process required, because a lot of times the information was classified, that it be declassified because the information circulars in the security directives were not classified documents that went out to the industry.
And it was simply very difficult to get clearance from the community in cases where there wasn't a direct connection to civil aviation for them to get the release information. We had to justify that in each case. Now, did we do it? Did we go in and say we want all 61, of these names? No, that was not -- we didn't do that. We focused on the information, again, that was specific to aviation at the time. Flynn, the pre-screening program, the computer assisted passenger pre-screening program, picked out nine of the 19 hijackers, terrorists, on September the 11th.
It didn't do anything to -- what did it do to try to prevent and use common sense and provide a higher standard of keeping these people off the plane? The CAPPS system was designed with -- you know, factoring algorithms and weights and other things to say these people are a significant or a heightened threat to U. Yet all nine that were picked out made it through the system.
Why is that? With regard to the checkpoint you don't need it because it is a percent application. Their installation costs vary from on up -- the installation can result in the total cost of -multiply three times the cost of the equipment for installation.
A very low estimate of the number of checked baggage EDS that you would need in the United States is 1, So we're looking at a year program in order to install that equipment at best, so you needed to have some way of narrowing its application and that's what CAPPS was for. How did it go at somebody that might hijack a plane? Especially given that these hijackers on September 11th may have had four-inch knives on them, walked through security, been detected with the knives and probably handed the knives back?
Why did CAPPS pick these people out, allow them through and probably even allow them through with knives? Other than -- see, they could have had a knife on them, made the CAPPS weight and rhythm standard, been picked out as somebody with a substantially higher security risk, and still be handed back a four-inch knife to get on a plane?
It was a process - MR. Flynn, about people that might be interested in hijacking planes or using planes as weapons? FLYNN: Oh, sure, in CAPPS the information is drawn from the passenger name record, has to do with behavior that is indicative of and then contra-indications of the behavior that indicates that you're not involved in any acts of crime towards the aircraft.
Again - MR. Can you repeat that? ROEMER: Let me ask you about your relationship with some of the other security intelligence agencies that you're supposedly working with leading up to September 11th. Flynn, and I want to get Mr. Manno in here as well, too. Each plane appears on a controllers radar screen as a so-called 'target' in controller-speak, and each blip representing a plane on that all-important radar is accompanied by a 'data block', which includes the abbreviated name of the airline AA for American Airlines, UA for United Airlines, for example, the flight number, the altitude of the plane, and a unique, 4-digit code each flight receives.
Only that day, Tuesday, September 11, was very, very different in these rooms from Cleveland to Washington to Boston. Instead of the normal 'data blocks', controllers were virtually blind in trying to track at least one of the planes, and perhaps as many as all four. One or more had 'lost' their transponders: the onboard cockpit device that sends the plane's critical information to the ATC system. Or more worrying, someone had known enough to turn them off.
All aircraft flying at over 10, feet above the altitude of small general aviation planes or those in 'restricted' airspace in high volume areas around major cities, must have their transponders on. Generally, ATC will radio the pilot and tell him if a plane's transponder is out.
A controller will then ask the pilot to turn the transponder back on which is done by simply turning what looks like a radio dial on the plane's 'dashboard' , or asking if the plane has a second unit. When they got no response, the controllers would have flagged their supervisors, who are usually pacing just behind them, looking over their shoulders.
Then, they would have examined the airspace around and in front of the planes: knowing for sure that there was a serious problem. At the FAA's national command center in Herndon, Virginia, some 30 miles from Washington, the usually predictable patterns on the small, 21 inch screens, as well as the huge 10 foot screen that display the nation's air traffic control system in action would have started to go awry.
By several minutes after nine, the two airline representatives that sit alongside their FAA colleagues at the Center would have heard about the terrible call that dispatchers at the American Airlines operation center near Dallas Ft Worth airport had fielded: a flight attendant on board flight 11 had called the center, via an emergency phone line, and said that a passenger was stabbing people on board.
It is not clear how much information she transmitted to her shocked coworkers. Staffers in the AA op center, some veterans of the military, still others trained in disaster response, were stunned by news of the call. With conflicting reports coming in, and controllers attempting to track 'invisible' airplanes, the news of the planes hitting the World Trade Center rocked the FAA headquarters.
Although the FAA doesn't technically close an individual airport, a ground stop prevents any plane, commercial or private, from taking off from that airport and can require incoming flights diverted. At , Garvey, in an historic and admirable step, and almost certainly after getting an okay from the White House, initiated a national ground stop, which forbids takeoffs and requires planes in the air to get down as soon as reasonable. The FAA had stopped the world. Five minutes later, FAA's few staffers who had stayed to set up the emergency operations center accomplished their mission and the center was up and running by FAA chief spokesman Scott Brenner gave immediate orders to his press corps: hit the vending machines on the floors below and bring back all the candy you could carry.
Throughout the day, a hard-core group of public affairs staffers grabbed slices of pizza, scarfed chocolate donuts and swigged water and coffee. But cellphones were virtually unusable because of the overloads, and FAA staffers in the emergency op center couldn't reach their in-house experts only a few floors below on the sidewalk.
Minutes later, the Pentagon was hit. A former government aviation official says the authorities must have been scrambling. Across town, at the offices of the Air Transport Association, employees could see the billowing smoke erupting from the Pentagon and the phones were buzzing.
Government sources warned the ATA to evacuate as well, that another plane might be headed to the nation's capital, and the airline industry's Washington eyes and ears ended up in nearby McPhearson Square, as temporarily disoriented as out of town tourists. Back at the FAA, workers were filing into the building, and reports were flooding in.
Contacting experienced aviation sources did nothing to clear up the chaos. And there were no explicit reports from the airplanes themselves that they had been hijacked. Things were moving rapidly, and at , Garvey ordered the diversion of all international flights to the U.Your whole testimony is -- it talks about process. Within the regulatory framework established by Congress, the FAA set security standards for airports, for United States airlines worldwide, and for foreign air carriers flying to the United States from approximately foreign airports. I have submitted to the Commission for inclusion in the record a written testimony supplementing my previous testimony on May 22nd,
MANNO: Well, the way that the process worked with the security directive is names were identified to an airline who then bumped those up against their reservation list to determine if somebody was actually going to fly.
Why is that? The FAA had worked hard to make changes in the aviation security baseline, changes supported by specific credible threat information and analysis. One minute later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Commission staff believes there is sufficient evidence that the false statements made to the commission were deliberately false. You have , the World Trade Center, you have these groups that may or may not be associated with al Qaeda because nobody knew what al Qaeda was.
The newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center now plays a role in that effort. If there's a low probability but high consequence possibility for that patient, we're going to look at a host of different scenarios.
Intelligence Committee per se, the agency maintained a civil aviation intelligence division that operated 24 hours per day.
The first layer of defense in aviation security was intelligence. While the FAA was not a member of the U. The characterization of the source is a significant factor as decision-makers depend on threat assessments based on credible information from reliable sources.
A system which had proven effective for the preceding 10 years could no longer be relied upon. On September 10th, , aviation security in this country was on a peacetime footing.
And while NORAD commanders did, indeed, order the Langley fighters to scramble at , as Scott and Arnold testified, it was not in response to the hijacking of American 77 or United Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami had their checked bags scanned for explosives before they were loaded onto the plane. More information is being shared among more agencies than ever before thus improving situational awareness of potential threats to U. It was a process - MR. In those cases, the checkpoint supervisor was required to be notified if a box cutter as an item in that category was encountered by a screener.
It is the first example of two separate planes having a 'common type rating'. This radar target was in fact Flight 77, but the target vanished as soon as it was discovered. Obviously to license a pilot requires a certain degree of education, but is there any monitoring of the schools at which young men and women receive that flight training?
The Bureau did not consider itself an intelligence production agency, perhaps because of the statutory restrictions on the dissemination of information it collected in its investigative role. Now we know that in the age of uncertainty, it is the price of mobility.
We are passing this around now. Now, my point, when I go back to it, why didn't I spend more time? For Salem al Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Majed Moqed who checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage was held until after their boarding on Flight 77 was confirmed. Within the regulatory framework established by Congress, the FAA set security standards for airports, for United States airlines worldwide, and for foreign air carriers flying to the United States from approximately foreign airports. We remain ready to revise our understanding of these topics as our work continues. It should be noted that the airports themselves did not have operational or enforcement jurisdiction over checkpoint screening operations, passenger pre-screening and checkpoint screening, based on regulations from the FAA these were the responsibility of the air carriers.