I will first layout the logical problem of evil, and then I will explain why it succeeds in disproving the existence of God. Could the inductive step in the evidential argument from evil perhaps be of that form? Many people believe in something like the Anselmian God Anselm : ch.
By contrast, if God is conceived of in a purely metaphysical way, and if no connection can be forged between the relevant metaphysical properties and the possession of significant power, knowledge, and goodness, then the problem of evil is irrelevant.
The subject of evil and why it exists is a difficult topic to find an exact answer to, especially when evil is presented in the form of nature. If one had knowledge of the totality of morally relevant properties, then it might well be possible to show both that there are no greater evils that can be avoided only at the cost of the evil in question, and that there are no greater goods that are possible only given that evil.
If God works in mysterious ways, how do I assess the likelihood that God has some inscrutable reason for tricking me into wrongly thinking that other minds exist, that the past exists, that an external world exists, and that I ought to save a child drowning in a shallow pond? Thus, if one considers a deity who is omniscient and morally perfect, but not omnipotent, then evil presumably would not pose a problem if such a deity were conceived of as too remote from Earth to prevent the evils we find here. Most of the time, this struggle is not an intelligent based one, but an emotional one. It is important to notice, however, that in formulating an indirect inductive argument from evil, one need not proceed along the route that Draper chooses. This man lives life without regret or worries. Augustine investigates the existence of evil by looking at two aspects, being the nature of evil and free will, and with free will the ability to make decisions which cause man to sin
The thrust of the argument was then that, first of all, an omniscient and omnipotent person could have prevented the existence of such evils without thereby either allowing equal or greater evils, or preventing equal or greater goods, and, secondly, that any omniscient and morally perfect person will prevent the existence of such evils if that can be done without either allowing equal or greater evils, or preventing equal or greater goods. The evils that exist are moral and non-moral evils. The problem of evil is not a correct argument. Is it impossible, then, to justify universal generalizations?
For many of the very undesirable states of affairs that the world contains are such as could be eliminated, or prevented, by a being who was only moderately powerful, while, given that humans are aware of such evils, a being only as knowledgeable as humans would be aware of their existence. This might seem like only a small sin, however Augustine demonstrates great regret in having participated in this act By understanding these two different types of questions, one will understand the implications of evil and therefore be able to establish if God truly is evil or if sin truly is the root of all the evil in the world.
If the latter thesis is correct, the argument from evil does not even get started. First, it can be formulated as a purely deductive argument that attempts to show that there are certain facts about the evil in the world that are logically incompatible with the existence of God. It is also relevant that, on the one hand, the suffering that people undergo apparently bears no relation to the moral quality of their lives, and, on the other, that it bears a very clear relation to the wealth and medical knowledge of the societies in which they live.
In this case, we ask the question, how can such a good and powerful God not prevent evil in the world. The reason that I am justified in believing the proposition that either God does not exist or there is a pen in my pocket is that I am justified in believing that there is a pen in my pocket. Some of the objections directed against this premise are less than impressive—and some seem very implausible indeed, as in the case, for example, of Peter van Inwagen, who has to appeal to quite an extraordinary claim about the conditions that one must satisfy in order to claim that a world is logically possible: One should start by describing in some detail the laws of nature that govern that world. Consider, in particular, the relevant premise in the more concrete version of the argument from evil set out in section 1. The result, in turn, is that discussions may very well become sidetracked on issues that are, in fact, not really crucial—such as, for example, the question of whether God would be morally blameworthy if he failed to create the best world that he could. The problem is that so many bad things happen in the world that Gods existence is debatable and if he is real, it is questionable that he is as powerful as the bible portrays him to be.