But the couple had both been working for Soviet intelligence since , running a seven-man spy ring. Lona recalls on the uncut film how this ring identified secret Nazis supporters in the United States, stole weapon parts from American arms factories, succeeded in recruiting an agent never identified in the Office of Strategic Services and worked with Abel for ten months in But their most valuable service for Moscow was to do with the Soviet atomic spy.
Yatskov said in that the material was a detailed description and drawing of the world's first atomic bomb which had just been dropped on Hiroshima. In the film interview Lona does not identify the spy at Los Alamos who gave her this priceless information.. However in "Strange Neighbours", all these references were edited out by the Soviet co-producers. Fortunately, I could remember most of them. Cohen said he had met a young American in his battalion in the International in Brigades in Spain, that after the Spanish war this young American had become a nuclear scientist and had eventually gone to work at Los Alamos.
Morris said that Moscow had given him the job of approaching this old comrade-in-arms to see if he were willing to spy for the Soviet Union. Morris said he had met his friend at Alexander's restaurant in Manhattan and the recruitment had been successful.
Further, Morris said that this scientist had never been suspected and that he was still alive, although not now living in the United States. Yatskov gave other clues. In an interview on the same film as the Krogers he said that his atomic spy ring at Los Alamos was ten strong--five agents he described as "sources of information", three who collected the material from them, and two senior KGB officers in overall charge.
The FBI had caught only seven of them. Did they include the scientist who provided Lona Cohen with the material she couriered to New York? Articles about the service's successes began to appear in Russian publications. Chikov's article quoted a message from a Soviet intelligence officer in the United States sent to Moscow in or about Morris Cohen's recruitment of his Spanish Civil War colleague.
We propose to recruit him through 'Louis'. But, significantly, he did not name the American physicist. Although in Chikov's version it is the physicist who first approaches Morris Cohen, the rest of his account served to confirm what Morris Cohen had said in those parts of his uncut film interview.
It seemed now only a matter of time before the physicist was identified. Michael Dobbs of the Washington Post led the hunt but it was not until 25 February that he announced that the Soviet agent was Theodore Alvin Hall, a Harvard-educated physicist, now aged 70, who had worked at Los Alamos in He had been investigated for espionage by the FBI in but was not prosecuted. He left the United States in for Britain and at the time of writing lives in Cambridge.
He has an inoperable cancer and refuses to confirm or deny any involvement in espionage activities. But is Hall the right man? He is a physicist, which fits Chikov's description of his profession.
But that is all. He was born in , which means that he would have been only ten years old at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and thirteen when it finished, so he was certainly not in the International Brigades. Morris Cohen died in Moscow in , a year after his wife. Anatoly Yatskov, the Soviet intelligence officer who ran them, also died in But he also had a small office in the FBI where he would go to read FBI material too sensitive to be allowed out of the building.
A lot of this related to the Venona decrypts, the radio traffic from the Soviet Consulate in New York in , which American code-breakers had been working on since the end of the war. The Venona material offered a window into the running of the Soviet espionage apparatus in the United States. Of course, it did not reveal names. But it did offer clues to the identity of Western agents recruited by the KGB and by painstakingly putting these clues together the FBI could narrow down a list of suspects and, hopefully, finally pinpoint the traitor.
American experts who have studied the Venona story, say that this one code-breaking success was responsible for nearly all the major spy cases of the postwar period.
Being party to the Venona material put Philby in a difficult and dangerous position--what should he do as he followed the FBI homing in on his Soviet intelligence service comrades? He discussed this with his Soviet control and they made some brutal decisions. If Philby were to use what he had learned from Venona to tip off those Soviet agents under suspicion so as to allow them to flee, then the FBI would suspect a leak. It would immediately ask: who has had access to Venona? Philby would be included in any such list and he would be automatically investigated.
There would be no proof against him but he would be compromised, and J. Edgar Hoover who did not trust the British anyway, would make certain that Philby would never again enjoy the same degree of confidence. This could imperil Philby's lifelong plan--that he should become the chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service, a coup without precedent in the history of espionage and one which would allow the KGB virtually to control the espionage Cold War. So Philby's knowledge of Venona would have to be used sparingly.
This meant that those agents who were of most importance to Moscow would be helped but all the others would have to be sacrificed. Donald Maclean would be helped because he had provided excellent intelligence from Washington and the KGB hoped he would continue to rise in the British Foreign Office.
He did. In November he became head of the American Department in London and passed to Moscow, among other things, the assurance obtained from President Truman by Prime Minister Attlee that the United States would not use the atom bomb in the Korean war. So Philby kept his Soviet control appraised of the progress the FBI was making towards identifying Maclean and at the right moment tipped off Maclean in time for him to flee to Moscow in May, That comrade was Yuri Sokolov.
They were gone within the hour. Simply because the Soviets did not consider them to be sufficiently important. The KGB's assessment of the Rosenbergs was that they were "minor couriers, not significant sources, who provided no valuable secrets and who were absolutely separate from major networks gathering atomic secrets".
They were not part of Yatskov's ten strong atom team. The fact is that in spy Cold War the Rosenbergs were considered expendable, especially as neither Philby nor his bosses in Soviet intelligence ever expected that even if the Rosenbergs were caught and convicted, the Americans would execute them. But there were counter-espionage pressures influencing the Rosenberg's fate that Moscow did not know about.
The FBI wanted to smash the entire Soviet espionage apparatus in the United States without revealing that it had been doing it through Venona--the fact that it had been breaking the Soviet code. So Hoover reasoned like this: if Julius Rosenberg could be persuaded to make a general confession, then the FBI could then arrest all the other agents they knew about only through Venona, but claim publicly that it had been Rosenberg's confession that had led them to these people--even though it had not.
Julius Rosenberg knew nothing about Venona or the FBI's aims but he resolutely refused to confess so the Justice Department decided to increase the pressure on him. Assistant U. Attorney Myles Lane told the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, "The only thing that will break this man Rosenberg is the prospect of a death penalty or getting the chair, plus that if we can convict his wife too, and give her a sentence of 25 or 30 years, that may serve to make this fellow disgorge and give us the information on these other individuals.
After consulting the Justice Department he sentenced not only Julius Rosenberg to death in the electric chair but Ethel Rosenberg as well, thus offering Rosenberg the chance of saving his wife's life with his confession.
But both refused to budge and were executed on 19 June after a worldwide campaign failed to convince President Eisenhower to grant them clemency. So no wonder that when Murray Sayle saw Philby in Moscow in he formed the impression that Philby "seemed to feel a personal responsibility to the Krogers to get them out of jail.
On the last night of our talks in Moscow I said to Philby, "Looking back on your life, do you have any regrets? I made mistakes and I paid for them. There is a postscript to this story. Like so many aspects of the secret world, you will have to make up your own mind as to where the truth lies. In the West he is hailed as "the spy who saved the world". Now new evidence emerging from the old KGB suggests that Penkovsky need not have died at all--he was betrayed by his friends, the British Secret Intelligence Service.
His story is one of high if dirty drama, a battle of wits in which a British triumph--not only over the KGB but over their American "cousins", the CIA--was soured by the fact that the game cost one brave man his life and another, a patriotic Englishman, his emotional sanity.
And it made many a CIA officer determined never to collaborate with the British again. It began on the night of August 12, when two young American tourists, strolling back to their hotel in Moscow, were approached by a well-dressed Russian who said he had valuable information he wanted them to pass on to the American embassy.
Gary Powers, the American U-2 spy plane pilot, shot down over the Soviet Union the previous May, was to go on trial in Moscow in four days' time. The Russian said he could expose the Soviet version of the incident as a lie: the U-2 had not been brilliantly brought down by a single missile, as the Soviet leader Khrushchev had claimed, but by 14, not one of which had been able to score a direct hit. One of the Americans decided that the Russian was probably a police provocateur, so he shook him off and returned directly to his hotel.
But the other American was impressed by the Russian's apparent sincerity. He accepted an envelope the Russian pressed on him and took it to the American embassy, where, after some bureaucratic difficulty, it was accepted and passed by diplomatic bag to the CIA in Washington.
The letter was from Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in the GRU Soviet military intelligence and it offered his services to the West as a spy. You will determine the manner of transmittal of this material yourself. It is desirable that the transfer be effected not through personal contact but through a dead letter drop.
Penkovsky was not unknown to Western intelligence services. Everyone turned him down. His war record, his marriage to a Russian general's daughter, and his steady progress up the Soviet promotion ladder did not fit a defector's profile. But by the atmosphere in Washington had changed. After studying the debriefing of the two tourists who had met Penkovsky, the CIA sent a special officer to the Moscow embassy to handle the initial contact with him.
The officer bungled it. He complained in his reports that he could not set foot on the streets of Moscow without being followed by the KGB. In the end, all he could suggest was that he should get a message to Penkovsky to throw his material over the 12ft wall of the American bachelor quarters after first practising with snowballs. Four months after Penkovsky had made his offer, the CIA had failed to get back to him.
With great reluctance and against the advice of many of its officers, it approached the British for help. Those who argued against this course insisted that the British were unreliable, that SIS had been penetrated, and recalled the Philby, Burgess and Maclean cases. Others pointed out that the British already knew about Penkovsky because he had been approaching British businessmen in Moscow and to go ahead without SIS collaboration risked straining relations between the two services even further.
Bringing in the British turned out to be fatal for Penkovsky. Looking back on it, one CIA officer summed up, "The big lesson of the Penkovsky case is never to enter into a joint operation with another service. Joint operations, by definition, double the risks of exposure. The differences in any two services' operating styles lead to confusion, misunderstandings and raise the possibility of compromise.
As the head of the SIS, the late Sir Dick White, told his officers later, "I would stress to all of you that, if proof were needed, this operation has demonstrated beyond all doubt, the prime importance of the human intelligence source, handled with professional skill and expertise.
Conveniently, Penkovsky was a member of this committee, and in April he handed a bulky package of documents and film to Wynne. The British and Americans could not at first believe their luck. But their experts pronounced the material genuine and important and over the next two years Penkovsky photographed or stole top-secret documents, war plans, nuclear missile diagrams and military manuals. He smuggled these to his American and British controllers by passing them to Western contacts like Wynne, either directly or via "dead letter drops"--pre-arranged hiding places in public areas.
It was Soviet missile manuals provided by Penkovsky before the Cuban missile crisis that enabled the Americans to interpret their photographs taken from the air over Cuba and to state categorically that the Soviets were installing missile launchers there.
And, it was Penkovsky's information that made the Americans realise that Khrushchev had greatly exaggerated Soviet missile capability. The British agree on Penkovsky's importance. Dick White has said, "I am given to understand that [his] intelligence was largely instrumental in deciding that the United States should not make a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, as a substantial body of important opinion in the States has been in favour of doing.
He led a privileged life in the Soviet Union, he had friends in the Soviet hierarchy, and his patron was Marshall Sergei Varentsov, a member of the Central Committee and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet. The name was used because it is analogous to spying through the keyhole of a door.
Argon made use of photographic film in a way similar of the original Corona satellites. Of the twelve known launches, seven were not successful for varying reasons.
This program would be led by the newly established National Reconnaissance Office, and operated from March—July Because it was only able to achieve a resolution similar to that of the KH-4 satellites, it was discontinued after only 3 launches. It was among the first successful Corona missions as it produced some of the first high resolution photos. These photos were typically of Soviet and Chinese missile emplacements. Gambit satellites would make use of a three camera system and missions would last typically up to eight days.
This satellite system would operate from July to April Of the fifty-four launch attempts, only three would fail, all of which were attributed to rocket failure. The average mission time of the Gambit III satellite systems were thirty-one days. The Gambit III satellites would differ from the Gambit I satellites in that the Gambit III had a four camera system, which carried over twelve thousand feet of film, and were able to produce resolutions as small as four inches.
These satellites photographed large areas of the earth at a time with moderate resolution. These satellites were also used for mapping missions, which were used in map making. These were used to eavesdrop on soviet communications and on soviet missile launches. Twenty launches were attempted, only one was unsuccessful.
These satellites operated for an increasing duration of time, with the longest mission lasting days. According to leaked documents, this program is currently operation under the code name Evolved Enhanced Crystal. The Kennan satellite system was the first satellite system to use electro-optical imaging, which gives real time imaging capabilities. The resolution of these satellites is estimated to be as low as 2 inches. These satellites are unique in that they have been placed in sun-synchronous orbits, which allow them to use shadows to help discern ground features.
These satellites became famous in when a CIA employee tried to leak the design of the satellite to the Soviets. He was tried and convicted of espionage. These satellites also had increased download times which allowed for faster processing of photos. It is also suspected that these satellites may have stealth technology to avoid detection by other satellites. The satellites were designed to monitor for nuclear explosions in space and in the atmosphere by measuring for neutrons and gamma rays.
A total of twelve Vela satellites were launched during the course of the Cold War. The Vela satellites became publicly famous because of the Vela Incident which occurred on 22 September It was theorized at the time that it was a nuclear test conducted by South Africa and Israel, but new evidence does not support this theory. They have also been used in the study of Gamma-Ray Bursts.
The U-2 was equipped with a camera which had a resolution of 2. The first overflights of the Soviet Union by the U-2 began in May The aircraft is known for setting speed and altitude records. The SR was equipped with optical and infrared imaging systems, electronic intelligence gathering systems, side looking airborne radar, and recorders for those systems which are listed.
The aircraft required two personnel to pilot it, one to pilot the aircraft, and a Reconnaissance Systems Officer RSO to operate the systems. During the course of its lifespan over Zenith satellites were launched, making it the most used satellite system ever. The Soviets concealed the nature of the system by giving the satellites the Kosmos designation.
KGB favoured active measures e. For war-time, KGB had ready sabotage operations arms caches in target countries. According to declassified documents, the KGB aggressively recruited former Nazi intelligence officers after the war. Moreover, KGB counter-intelligence vetted foreign intelligence sources, so that the moles might "officially" approve an anti-CIA double agent as trustworthy.
In retrospect, the captures of the moles Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen proved that Angleton, though ignored as over-aggressive, was correct, despite the fact that it cost him his job at CIA, which he left in Their efforts were thwarted by the CIA. These banks had made numerous loans to advanced technology companies and had many of their officers and directors as clients.
During that time, the Soviet secret service tried very hard to ensure support for his party and his allies and even predicted an easy victory for him. Three years later, the KGB in that region increased from 90 to , and by printed more than newspaper articles. Under Andropov's command, Service A , a KGB division, falsified the information in a letter to Moudud Ahmed in which it said that he was supported by the American government and by even sent a letter accusing the Reagan administration of plotting to overthrow President Zia and his regime.
The letter also mentioned that after Mujib was assassinated the United States contacted Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad to replace him as a short-term President. The party received out of seats, but the Zia regime did not last long, falling on 29 May when after numerous escapes, Zia was assassinated in Chittagong. Two days after the uprising, Nur Muhammad Taraki , leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan , issued a notice of concern to the Soviet ambassador Alexander Puzanov and the resident of Kabul -based KGB embassy Viliov Osadchy that they could have staged a coup three days earlier hence the warning.Penkovsky himself was determined to go ahead with his spying activities, his material was invaluable, the CIA had tried to set up its own scheme for receiving this material but had failed, and Janet Chisholm, a mother of three small children, seemed the most innocent-looking choice for the job of beating KGB surveillance. The Chisholms, who had diplomatic immunity, went off to other postings. This task was assigned to a German agent, scientist Dr.
But Worm got a strange hunch. Soviet intelligence officers were amazed at the mutual consideration and true loyalty which prevailed among homosexuals. It discredited the FBI, which had failed to uncover the Soviet atomic spy ring until it was too late. Penkovsky was not unknown to Western intelligence services.
When General Douglas MacArthur, who had been blamed for not having foreseen certain developments in the Korean War, was asked by the Senate investigating committee in to explain why the North Korean invasion caught the Americans by surprise, he gave a classic reply from which many an intelligence chief could take his cue. Photo Overdrive - A tool that was much larger than many other spy equipment. Tell us again how you managed to join SIS. There is nothing, no means or methods, except the accidental spy methods - if you can get somebody to betray the enemy's highest circles, that can get such information as that.
General Orlov! This practice is justified on the ground that it helps them evaluate the information from their own secret sources abroad and render more accurate estimates of the intentions and capabilities of other countries. Soviet acquisition of this correspondence reveals what they know about Russian intelligence activities and may sometimes warn of an impending exposure and arrest of an agent.