He also rejects commonly believed conception of self though he does not deny the continuity of the stream successive states that compose life. The self or the ego denotes nothing more than this collection and the existence of man depends on this collection and it dissolves when the collection breaks up. Consequently the identity of a person is to be found in the identity of consciousness.
Of course, we are not always conscious. In contrast toLocke, Hume does not believe in an identical self. From this formation of belief in general, we arrive at belief in causes, continued existence, and then on to the personal identity. For Hume identity depends upon the three relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation.
This is only by the reason of imagiantion that we do with another objects. Actually, he himself knows that his principle is not completely satisfactory.
It is related to inheritenceness and composition of perceptions. If all our perceptions are different and independent to each other and there is no idea of self then, Hume questions how were they organized and related to each other.
In other words, we ask this question as what is the prime substance and principle by which we integrate and organize our perceptions. Hume himself asks this question and he found himself incompetent to answer it. Modern logical positivists have tried to give an empirical explanation of this theory, as Hume does.
But, it has also some dogmaticism and it failed to give any satisfactory solution. Although memory seems to be the most important and the primary criterion to the discovery of the personal identity, but it is not only based on memory and continuity but on some other factors also. Chisholm attacks on Humean position to say that Hume made a conceptual error in his notion of what constitutes the idea of self, he seems contradictory when he examine self in experience and lastly, he is only aware about particular mental data.
Because we cannot deny our experiences about the authority of awareness of self. This self awareness makes possible all concentration and contemplation. The self which is the basis of all knowledge cannot be perceived as an object.
Finally, it is also to be considered that Hume accepts scepticism in his all logical and philosophical speculations. According to scepticism, we cannot get the definite knowledge of anything. Hume follows this rule in his entire speculation, but softly. So, David Hume is both an epistemological and metaphysical subjectivist and a moral and ethical relativist.
His theories make both philosophical knowledge and scientific knowledge impossible. In present times, analytical point of view is more dominant. His thinking not only effects epistemology and metaphysics, but every field of philosophy. Two major theories of contemporary ethics Emotivism and Prescriptivism have originated from his thinking. He introduces memory as being the key criterion to manifest persistence of a person over time. Various criticisms have been contrasted to this view. The simplest, but most striking counter-argument is how human dispositions of forgetfulness are combinable with such an approach.
What impact would a lack of memory have, even if it is only a certain period of time one cannot remember? Would this inevitably lead to a loss of personal identity? It seems as if what fundamentally distinguishes the abovementioned approaches to personal identity is the philosophical stance from which they emerge: their mutual belief in personal identity and its persistence over time.
Problematic of each account is their undeniable refutability. In contrast to Locke, Hume tries to follow and understand psychological habits of human beings before trying to resolve them.
He nevertheless acknowledges that non-philosophical people seem to be aware of the fact that those habits are not accurate viz. Hence, even in the common view, the concept of numerical identity or sameness excluded changes and is constituted by unchanging, uninterrupted, and stable characteristics. Hume attends to this matter because he finds that sensations towards an imagination of identity are similar to those perceived towards a succession of objects.
What is special about his argument is that he himself feels the need to acknowledge a contradiction for which he can provide no answer: the origin of his idea that each perception is a distinct entity. One response to this issue is that Hume cannot help but espouse the common belief that there are connections between distinct experiences which are neither traceable nor tangible through introspection.
Despite opponent interpretations of Hume entirely denying the notion of mind, Pike argues that Hume bundle of perceptions constitutes a conceptual mind. So far provided insight in the debate about personal identity exposes the problem of reconciling variables in the criterion for existence, psychological fundaments, and continuity of personal identity. This essay forwards the thesis that he succeeds in observing and plausibly describing underlying patterns of attributing identity to individual persons.
Doubts concerning his account could be seen as capitulations to the belief in personal persistence regardless of rational commitments elsewhere.
Finally, he allows common intuitions and linguistic practices to suffice as justification in the belief in personal identity over time, when saying that he allows himself to follow his natural inclination even in philosophical investigation.
Plausibility appeals to the degree of intelligibility of a claim rather than its infallibility and unfailing justification. Hume approaches the preliminary human phenomenon of personal identity on what he considers to be the very basis of its appearance: common linguistic habits and notions.
His account establishes itself in contrast to views that proffer the self as a mental substance, or those which place memory as a key factor in persistence, in not giving a definite answer. On the basis of his inspection he describes his findings and subsequently reconciles them with other facts regarding individuals.
This results in his argument considering only the metaphysical criterion of identity, though this is nevertheless plausible if not justified in being commonly accepted. His self-criticism is accounted here to emphasise the authenticity of his theory, as it confronts natural human inclination with philosophical accuracy.
The essay on hand has dealt with perniciousness and probable ambiguities of the subject, as well as contemporary views on Descartes and Locke and their respective limitations. Works Cited Anonymus. John Locke. The Blackwell dictionary of Western philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Copenhaver, R. Reid on Memory and Personal Identity. Meditations and Other Metaphilsical writings. London: Penguine Books Ltd. Flanagan, O. The Robust Phenomenology of the Stream of Consciousness. Block, O.
Massachusetts: Institute of Technology Press. Greetham, B. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hume, D.For Hume identity depends upon the three relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. Why do we see any object as a continuous existence? Oxford: Oxford University Press. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Lastly, the relation of contiguity is necessary to secure the idea of one single thing the self where we have knowledge of a succession of related perceptions being entertained by the same subject. For there to by argument we would need something to reference our identity to, we would need something the same perception, when in fact they are not. Yet if these perceptions resemble the perception of something now being viewed, we are personal to think them else, another object. The locus classicus is a known literary essay by R.
Chisholm attacks on Humean position to say that Hume made a conceptual error in his notion of what constitutes the idea of self, he seems contradictory when he examine self in experience and lastly, he is only aware about particular mental data. However, we need to make a comparison to discover the similarity so that the principle of resemblance be preserved. By laying down the way to the related problems of the nature of my belief that I am a self, and of the source from which such belief comes. However explaining this terminological point would have taken me very far away from my main objective here.
This poses a problem.
The Tibetan philosopher, Tsongkapa argues that the notion of self-identity cannot be conceived of as an autonomous entity nor can it be considered as the aggregates alone. He also believes that we often attribute identity in an improper sense, like when we attach the label to variable or interrupted objects.
Because I have seen it many time I do not think twice about the bend in the bottle as I grab it, nor the decline in water after I take it from my lips yet upon reflection it becomes clear that each of these actions would break my initial perception of the water bottle. The same is here true for objects; Hume argues that because of causation we believe we have an unbroken, lasting perception of an object, even though no such thing is possible. Pears forms his argument based on the first paragraph on the last page of the appendix. Despite opponent interpretations of Hume entirely denying the notion of mind, Pike argues that Hume bundle of perceptions constitutes a conceptual mind.